THE CONTRACTUAL NATURE OF BAIL

THE CONTRACTUAL NATURE OF BAIL

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• The granting of bail does not equate to permanent freedom; it temporarily releases the accused from custody for the duration of the trial, ceasing upon conviction or acquittal.

• Judicial discretion plays a crucial role in bail decisions, where courts must judiciously assess the likelihood of the accused appearing for trial and base their decisions on empirical facts rather than irrelevant matters.

In Scales Olatunji Ishola V. Federal Republic of Nigeria (CA/C/385C/2020, 12 Feb 2021) per M. L. Shuaibu JCA, thus, ‘The right of bail, a constitutional right, is contractual in nature. The effect of granting bail is not to set the accused free for all times in the criminal process but to release him from custody of the law and to entrust him to appear at his trial at a specific time and place. The freedom is temporary in the sense that it lasts only for the period of the trial. It stops on conviction and or on acquittal of the accused. The contractual nature of bail is that before any person is released on bail he must execute, a bond for such sum of money as determined by either the Police or the Court on the condition that such a person must attend at the time and place mentioned therein until otherwise directed. See SULEMAN and ANOR v. C.O.P PLATEAU STATE (2008) LPELR – 3126 (SC). The main function of bail is to ensure the presence of the accused at trial. Thus, if there is any reason to believe that the accused is likely to jump bail, bail will properly be refused by the trial Court in exercise of its discretion in dealing with the application. As rightly posited the decision whether or not to grant bail on offences that are ordinarily bailable is a matter within the judicial discretion of the Court. A judicial discretion has to be exercised judiciously and judicially and the reason for the exercise of the discretion must be given. See DARLINTON v. F.R.N (2018)11 NWLR (prt 1629)152. Similarly, the Court in the exercise of its discretion, must only act on empherical facts or materials placed before it and not on extraneous or irrelevant matters.’